Gary,

A few immediate thoughts on your post:

I think it's unfair - or misleading - to criticize contemporary academic philosophy's professionalization without discussing the professionalization of the academy as a whole. After all, a great deal of what used to count as philosophy is now done in sociology, anthropology, economics, literature, and history departments (not to mention the natural sciences, which I think we ought to leave to the side for a moment, since they have evolved in a very different way from the humanities and social sciences). In this light, I think there's nothing special about professional philosophy's being "severed from living"; indeed, in the context of the humanities philosophy might well be more connected to the problems of life (at least in some ways of framing them) than its sister disciplines.

Now, you may want to argue that philosophy has a special obligation as a self-conscious continuation of the Socratic tradition to take up the great questions in ways that help people outside the field lead flourishing lives. But to see this as the central mission of philosophy is to pick out a very narrow strand of its history as representing its essential purpose. Even the most obvious representatives of this how-then-shall-we-live tradition - Socrates, Boethius, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre - have a great deal to say about questions that are really pretty nearly irrelevant to the living of a flourishing life (think about the Sophist or Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego). And most great figures in the history of philosophy have spent the bulk of their energies on the development and exploration of ideas utterly unconnected to "education for citizenship". How much force would Parmenides, Aristotle (and here I'm thinking of the Aristotle of the Physics, the Metaphysics, the Categories, and so on), Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger have if they "hit the streets of public life"? I think the streets wouldn't put up with it for long. Some of those figures - Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel are the most obvious - have had important influences on public life, but that's hardly the measure of their greatness as philosophers. The "frivolous and self-important play of theories and arguments" - and here I assume you mean theories and arguments about issues like modality, causality, logic, abstract objects, justification and knowledge, substance and accident, perception, consciousness, meaning and reference, and the like - has been going on since Aristotle.

Finally, in my experience it's been the case that philosophers - and philosophy students - tend to be much more thoughtful (and, yes, clearer and more careful) about the nature and purpose of their own lives. This is merely an empirical observation and may or may not be true in a broad sense. But I have yet to meet a philosopher who, when discussing the big questions, doesn't have a very good sense of how she might answer them and very good reasons for why she would answer them as she would. Obviously this individual thoughtfulness doesn't automatically translate into action in the public square, and I agree that the world would be a better place if there were more strategically placed "bridge figures" connecting philosophical reflection with the organs of public opinion. But pressing for that to happen is different from criticizing the nature of contemporary philosophical discourse.

Geoff,

I pretty much agree with what you said. As the post's title said I couldn't resist.... having a go. Its polemics but it was unfair.

I do need to contextualize the professionalization of philosophy with the professionalizaiton of the academy. What is special about philosophy's being severed from living is that being connected with the living--lived experience--is what the humanities were supposed to be about.

I agree about the Socratic dimension of philosophy that takes up the problems of life being a minor strand; an ethical anabranch. On the other hand, Socrates also stands for a mode of critical thinking through dialogue that is part of the mainstream philosophical tradition. It is done through texts rather than speech today. That mode of thinking is what enables citizens to think for themselves--to be autonomous and independent and not rely on authority, convention etc.

Your interpretation of frivolous etc is right. It has been going on since Plato and it has become an entrenched part of academic philosophy. And it can go on even though it will be increasingly difficult to do so with the substantial cut backs to the humanities in Australia. But it is not the sort of philosophy that would be relevant in public life---Seneca's point. That philosophy would have a different starting point and be practised in a different way.

I agree with your philosophers and thoughtfulness paragraph too. It's not about thinking in the academy and action in the public square. Its about critically thinking about the issues that arise in the public sqaure and evaluating different ways of resolving these issues.

As for Hegel etc you are right about the street's reception of those texts---given the language. Yet Hegel did open up a way of doing philosophy differently in The Phenomenology of Spirit. It is an historical way of doing philosophy that connects philosophy up to literature and revolution, cultural forms of consciousness--discourses now---history, nationalism etc. It has been very influential--look what Nietzsche or Adorno or Derrida did with it in their different ways. We feel the Phenomeology's reverberations today even though only a few will ever read it. Those reverberations impel philosophy into the public culture, where it becomes something quite different from the scientific philosophy in the academy.

There is a seriousness under the polemics.

interesting,

"(not to mention the natural sciences, which I think we ought to leave to the side for a moment, since they have evolved in a very different way from the humanities and social sciences)"

maybe this is exactly what this is about in the end of the day - may i just quickly talk about my perception of scientific evolution and the academy as a whole before i get to gary's pleasing criticism of 'professional philosophy'.

i suppose that the tremendous increase in knowledge and areas of inquiry during the first half of the 19th century induced a huge need to construct systematic world views. the almost compulsive desire for order as exhibited by comte, the founder of positivist ideology, was reason enough to long for the transformation of several areas of inquiry into positvistic sciences. there were after all quite a number of discoveries that had to be laid down systematically: darwin and biology, urea synthesis and organic chemistry, brownian motion and physics and so on. the positivist programme was presented by comte as a necessary ingredient for the well-being of man through scientific and technical control over nature. the scientific method was thus born whereby it must be considered that, in good realist tradition, the inductive method of scientifc procedure stood well above theoretical considerations. theories were reduced to systematically induced intermediates with the sole purpose to carry out more research. the epistemic truth value was no longer of importance, instead, the inductive production of systematically "fitting" knowledge that would make more scientific research possible. whilst idealism transcends the object-subject divide (kant), positivism simply eliminates the subject.

the rise of positivism quickly led to epistemology being replaced by scientific theory, or as geoff pointed to it all having been philosophy prior to current demarcations: science split from philosophy. the noble and trascendental inquiry into the conditions of epistemic possibilities became pointless in the sense that knowledge was from now on implicitly defined via scientific achievement. this is mostly indicative by considering the positivist killing of anything non-experiential, the scientific episteme does not relate to the knowing subject. from kant via hegel and marx, the subject had been understood as the spirit or awareness of knowledge, however, scientific theory avoids the question of the knowing subject and turns directly towards the sciences, which were given as a system of propositions and methods, as a complex of rules in accordance to which theories are constructed. this unreflective scientism, referring to the notion that science is to be equated with knowledge, unfortunately overlooked the fact that scientific information is a particular category of knowledge and not knowledge per se. as a result, the scientific and technological advancedment into industrial society lead to a world with an omnipresent reflection of positivistic sciences and represents a deceptive impression of absolute truths in science, technology and market. the lack of any paradigmatic considerations thus lead to the idea of absolute knowledge, positivistic and unreflective. or as the young and radical habermas put it: "to deny reflection IS positivism".

the pragmatically laden lack of epistemic integrity as exhibited by positivism and the natural sciences might even make sense considering scientific and technological applications. the unemancipated illusion of absolute knowledge may have been one of the few aspects polluting thought, preventing a general awareness of paradigmatic possibilites. the social consequences however only really begin to arise with the analogous application of positivist methodology in the social sciences. here the investigation is no longer concerned with objects, but with knowing subjects, human beings. whilst the empirical investigation of factual reality may be appropriate in natural science, the analogous application of this method in the social sphere actually contributes to the oppression and exploitation of man. the empirical investigation of social reality is not capable of grasping the social processes that have produced this reality historically, and is thus unreflective of social totality. it is being overlooked that empirical social science, through its unreflective affiliation to industrial production and related power gradients actually consolidates the status quo. this form of inquiry serves technical interests in order to generate mechanisms to control the oppressed individual, very much in the same sense as comte's scientific control over nature without any regard for historical or philosophical consistency. only an historical analysis as exhibited by various strands of neo-marxist thought can serve to this end. accordingly, theories should not merely be valued by referring to their appeal to factual reality, but also in light of the historical modalities of social circumstances (e.g. using criteria such as emancipation). the empirical sphere may be helpful, but ought not to be the deciding factor.

since 'the academy' is largely based on these methods of investigation, i do feel rather attached to gary's criticism of the professionalization of philosophy. gary couldn't resist to follow his intuition, despite the oppressive forces of 'the academy'. for that i salute a free spirit!

what is especially interesting is the anglo-american emphasis in connection with terms such as 'professionalization' and 'entrenchment'. maybe 'professional philosophy' ought to refer to the positivist/analytical ingredient only, especially considering the idealist critique of analytical philosophy from the epistemic level all the way to political praxis. after all, the revolutionary philosopher is aware of this issue. critical theory as fashioned by the frankfurt school was very active in trying to reform higher education in just this/your sense. the professionalization and teaching theme quickly reminds of freire's concept of education banking, in other words adds to my conviction that anglo-american philosophy is largely oppressive and adds to the status quo through its unreflective affiliation to the social sphere, with no appreciation of historical totality. the pedagogic and social outcome of anglo-american philosophy as described in the post is merely indicative of it's content. the obsession with the idea of absolute knowledge, implicitly killing the knowing subject, makes impossible any transformative dynamic of philosophical practice and the pragmatic excuse isn't even interesting unless driven by prevailing power gradients. but then again, how politically explicit can analytical philosophy afford to be, considering that history might interpret it as imperialist ideology someday? analytical philosophy would have to negate itself in order to extend into sociopolitical thought. what is required is progressive thought, critical reflection within the historical context that "can produce new texts from the insights of the old".

professional philosophy in this sense is part of the systemic machinery, devoid of any critical spark. it's end of history, actually tolerating functionalist prescriptions of interest-driven (fascist, in the widest sense) ideology ("a new paradigm with which people can be controlled" - chomsky).

oh dear... cyncism creeping in. but thanks, gary. how about you clothe the critique in revolutionary language? then extend it over the entire academy (ie. philosophy and what used to be philosophy before having turned to empirical social science?).

Mike,

It does have a lot to do with the development of the natural sciences into scientism. That means philosophy has to resist since it is part of the humanities.

I pretty much concur with your account of the development of the positivist natural sciences into scientism and the denial of critical reflection and the knowing subject. I would tie that development more closely to an instrumental reason that dominates nature.

That scientism pervades the social sciences--eg. neo-classical economics---- to such an extent that the critics of economic (neo-liberal) deregulatory policy in Australia to create new markets for capital are deemed to be irrational by definition. But this social science is less an affirmation of the status quo that an attempt to remodel society in accord with a free market capitalism.

I do see the scientific side of Anglo-American philosophy being a part, developing, and an opologist for scientism sand so becoming an instrumental reeason in the proccess. There are reactions and resistance from within analytic philosophy to this ----especially in ethics----but it does not approach the level of critique the Frankfurt School.

My downwplaying the Frankurt School, despite sharing their critique of modernity, is that they did not really develop an alternative conception of philosophy that could step out of the academy into political life. We got negative dialectics, philosophy turned in on itself critiquing its concepts and an aesthetic philosophy--which I try to work with on junk for code.

The promise was there in Adorno's Minima Moralia--which was a cultural criticism of everyday life; but it was never developed into a political reason that could function in the world of public policy.

I'm interested in a eco-philosophy critically working in political life through engaging with public issues---see public opinion.