January 13, 2005
During the holiday season I watched a number of American law and order shows and films on free-to air-television. I was struck by their different (conservative?) understanding of state, civil society and family to that of liberalism. Most of the shows assumed thatthe state is bad (a Leviathan); that civil society is lawless and riddled with crime; and the family (or personal relationships)is the place of love, romance and goodness.
I exaggerate. A lot of crime also takes place in the institution of the family in these shows. However, in this conservative discourse the family is treated both in mythic terms and as the cornerstone of America. (Oh, as an aside the Constitution appears to be a Platonic document).
Now, rest assured, I'm not going to do an Adorno and engage in a critique of the trashy products of the culture industry and celebrate high culture by standing in the academy. It is the politics in these shows that I am interested in; the way that the dualistic liberal understanding of civil society (as good) and state (as bad) is undermined.
I have to admit that the effect of the conservatism of these shows was to create a nostalgic mood. I found myself becoming nostalgic for liberalism. Why? Because it retained some understanding of the opposition between state and society--a relationship of opposition---however crude that understanding of bad state and good society has been. Liberalism retained the idea that more power to the government meant less power to the people.
Sure, liberalism did not have much of a dialectical understanding. It has failed to grasp the way the dualism of state and civil society is an interaction of opposites; the way that this conflict has lead to changes in the character of both the state and society; and the changing historical relationship between state and civil society.
Is not the duality of state and society transformed by parliament. Does not the emergence of parliament as abody of power initially represent the way society sized the state's own legislative power for itself?
What I came back to in liberalism was the way it worked with an opposition between state and society to hold onto the idea that a free life involves living in a community that governs itself. It was heritage that we should hang onto and build on.
How do we do that?
One way is Foucault's governmentality approach.
This combines a microphysics of power with a macropolitical question of the state to look at power relations concentrated in the form of the state in terms of the practice of government. The neo-liberal state itself is a tactic of government that makes possible what is within the competence of the state and what is not.However, Foucualt does not adddress the nature of the state.
Another way is to think historically about the state/society relationship is by exploring the way this historical relationship is involves the nature of the state changing. A core failure of constitutional liberalism has been its inability to grasp the historical development of the diverse institutions of the state.
So we can address this issue by turning to Carl Schmitt's taxonomy of the state as outlined in his Four Articles 1931-1938. Oddly enough I've been reading this text in conjunction with watching the products of the culture industry. In the first article, 'On the Way to the Total State' Schmitt usefully classifies 'the state' into 5 categories based on their sphere of activity.
Thus we have:
*the judicial state, in which the main political activities are to adjudicate in keeping with concrete situations;
*the legislative state, which makes provisions by law for the perpetuation of a certain order based on pre-established norms;
*the administrative state, which is concerned with the objective management of public undertakings by the enactment of purely technical instructions;
*the governing state, which is the venue for the personal and an authoritarian will and commandment of a head of state;
*the state of exception, as an alternative to the judicial and legislative states, in which the effective normative system is challenged and replaced by the temporary replacement by a government of decree and emergency order backed by the authority of the court martial of summary justice.
As I'm reading Schmitt's Four Articles I could not but help notice the emergence of Schmitt into Australian political discourse based on a reading of Mark Lilla's The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics. So what are these liberals saying about this figure that many find dangerous?
John Quiggin takes the opportunity to repost his earlier review of The Reckless Mind. In the section on Schmitt he states that:
"Lilla is equally good on another Nazi thinker, Carl Schmitt, who remains largely unknown in the English-speaking world, but is hugely influential in some European circles, both on the right and on the post-Marxist left. Schmitt's ideas themselves do not seem all that interesting - a melange of 'realist' international theory and authoritarian critiques of liberalism, with an underlay of religious irrationalism. What is more interesting is how such ideas have remained influential, and have spread from the right to the academic left, despite their obviously poisonous consequences. Lilla shows how the European New Left found Schmitt's critique of liberalism appealing, paving the way for the subsequent capitulation of postmodernism."
Has John read Schmitt I wonder? If not, how can he make that judgement?
Rafe Champion is content to summarize Lilla's account of what Rafe calls an 'alarming body of thought'. Why alarming? Rafe says:
"Schmitt is fundamentally a conflict theorist, with a Hobbesian view of society as a war of all against all, sans the potentially liberal vision of a sovereign role to keep the conflicts under control in a potentially benevolent or at least peaceful order. Enmity is the mainspring of action and identity, 'show me your enemy and you define yourself'. It appears that Schmitt's view is entirely 'essentialist', that is, it is based on an assumption that is held so strongly that it is not open to correction by evidence or argument."
Rafe has not read much Schmitt on the changing nature of the sovereign either as he misses the historical dialectics. Essentialism is used as a weapon.
What is useful about Schmitt's taxonomy of the state is the way he makes use of it. In the article 'Neutrality According to International Law and National Totality' Schmitt reworks the state of exception in terms of totality of state and nation.The total state is:
"...not a separate, distinctive state form. Rather it is a moment in the effective development of every type of state, marked by the moblization of all energies in a certain direction."(p.39)
This a moment is marked by the need to eliminate the executive and legislature distinction in favour of the executive and to restrict individual rights to confront and overcome a dangerous situation.
Is not this moment of totality what we are currently living through with the national security state in a situation of a war on terrorism?
This is why we read Schmitt. Far from being poisonous or dangerous he has good ideas and insights about political life.
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"This is why we read Schmitt. Far from being poisonous or dangerous he has good ideas and insights about political life. "
So why did he support the Nazis? Were some of his ideas good and others poisonous and dangerous? Or was he acting in contradiction of his own thought? Or, did the Nazis have good ideas and insights about political life?
"is not this moment of totality what we are currently living through with the national security state in a situation of a war on terrorism?"
Given this analogy, I can see why Bush, Ashcroft and Gonzales migh like Schmitt. But why should opponents of these developments regard him as anything other than poisonous and dangerous?