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September 10, 2008
In the Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Samuel Freeman (ed.), [Harvard University Press, 2007] John Rawls says that political philosophy in modern liberal society has no special authority. It is simply a continuation -- more intense and perhaps more coherent -- of what citizens are able to think concerning their own political institutions. Rawls insists that it is distinctive of modernity to consider every normal adult as capable of reasoning about political matters. To say that reason is to settle issues is just to say that we must "present our views with their supporting grounds in a reasonable and sound manner so that others may judge them intelligently. " He says:
A second question is this: In addressing this audience, what are the credentials of political philosophy? What are its claims to authority? I use the term “authority” here because some have said that writers in moral and political philosophy claim a certain authority, at least implicitly. It has been said that political philosophy conveys a claim to know, and that the claim to know is a claim to rule. This assertion is, I believe, completely mistaken. In a democratic society at least, political philosophy has no authority at all, if by authority is meant a certain legal standing and possession of an authoritative weight on certain political matters; or if, alter natively, it means an authority sanctioned by long-standing custom and practice, and treated as having evidential force. Political philosophy can only mean the tradition of political philosophy; and in a democracy this tradition is always the joint work of writers and of their readers. This work is joint, since it is writers and readers together who produce and cherish works of political philosophy over time and it is always up to voters to decide whether to embody their ideas in basic institutions. Thus, in a democracy, writers in political philosophy have no more authority than any other citizen, and should claim no more. I take this to be perfectly obvious and as not needing any comment, were it not that the contrary is occasionally asserted. I mention the matter only to put aside misgivings about this.
He adds that some may respond that political philosophy hopes for the credentials of, and implicitly invokes the authority of, human reason.
This reason, Rawls says, is simply the shared powers of reasoned thought, judgment, and inference as these are exercised by any fully normal persons beyond the age of reason, that is, by all normal adult citizens. Suppose we agree with this and say political philosophy does invoke this authority. But so likewise do all citizens who speak reasonably and conscientiously in addressing others about political questions, or indeed any other question. Seeking what we have called the authority of human reason means trying to present our views with their supporting grounds in a reasonable and sound manner so that others may judge them intelligently.
Striving for the credentials of human reason does not distinguish political philosophy from any kind of reasoned discussion on any topic. All reasoned and conscientious thought seeks the authority of human reason.
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