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'Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainity and agitation distinquish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones ... All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.' Marx

rethinking rights--Miko Bagaric « Previous | |Next »
May 31, 2006

Mirko Bagaric, the head of the law school at Deakin University, and author of It's a Matter of Opinion: An Analysis of the Defining Issues of our Time, has a crack at rights in the Canberra Times. It is more sophisticated that the usual attacks launched by The Australian's conservatives, such as Janet Albrechtsen, who view 'the alluring language of right as cementing into the law a radical left-wing political agenda.' Albrechtsen is pmore or less a conservative warrior in the culture wars on behalf of Murdoch.

Bagaric's op.ed: introduces rights in terms of the way that:

...the distorted individualist moral code that pervades our collective thinking. Over the past 60 years there has been a slow but unmistakable change in the manner in which we approach moral issues. Our personal morality is central to our conduct because it impacts, often subconsciously, on all of the important decisions we make in our daily lives. You don't need to be a philosopher to recognise the fundamental shift. We are now wired in a way that the standard currency for dealing with moral issues is that of "rights". Rights claims emerged in response the atrocities during World War II as counter-ideologies to combat tyrannical regimes.

Then we have the critique:
It's easy to invent rights claims because rights are intellectual nonsense. No one has yet been able to provide tenable answers to questions such as: Where do rights come from? How can we distinguish real from fanciful rights? This allows people to make up rights as they "go along".

That ignores the tradition of natural right doesn't it? Or the way that libertarians ground rights on private property.The 'intellectual nonsense' is a reference to Benthamite utilitarianism, isn't it.

Bagaric continues. He says that rights are seductive because they are individualising claims and seem to give us a protective sphere. They appeal to those of us who have a "me, me, me" approach to life.
So what is the problem with this? Self-interest is what liberalism is grounded on. That foundationalism means me, me, me doesn't it?

Bagaric says rhe problem with rights is that:

... they limit our moral horizons to ourselves - the moral compass is suspended in an inward direction. But buried only slightly beneath such an approach are the inescapable realities that as people we live in communities; communities are merely the sum of a number of other individuals; and the actions of one person (exercising his or her rights) can have a (negative) effect on the interests of others.

If you want to know what interests we have, the answer is simple. It is a matter of biology and sociology, not misguided social and legal engineering. To attain any degree of flourishing we need the right to life, physical integrity, liberty, food, shelter, property and access to good health care and education.


Bagaric's phrase 'the moral compass is suspended in an inward direction' ignores the external relationship between right-bearing individuals --we can do what we desire (freedom) provided we do not infringe on the rights of others. Note the way that the individual 'interests' is is a matter of biology and sociology and that communites are merely the sum of of a number of other individuals. What surfaces is utilitarianism.; a utilitarianism that sees a Bill of Rights as social engineering. Doesn't the self interest of utilitarianism also mean me , me, me, provided I don't harm others?

Bagaric then says that the:

Talk of rights beyond these interests is destructive of human wellbeing. The most dispiriting aspect of the rights wave is that it has swept from our psyche the most important concept that is central to our wellbeing: the common good, measured in terms of net human flourishing. The common good is a notion that has become a relic of the past. We are paying heavily for the disinterest shown towards others. As with most short-term pursuits, it is self-defeating.

We still talk in terms of public interest:-eg., irrigators taking a reduction in water entitlements to ensure the sustainability of water as a natural resource for a regional community. That indicates that there is not 'the disinterest shown towards others' that Bagaric claims. Therei s a recognition of some form of commonality, albeit one expressed in utilitarian terms.

Bagaric is confused. You cannot get wellbeing-- the common good, measured in terms of net human flourishing--from utilitarianism. What the latter gives you is happness as merely the sum of the happiness of all individual's desires or interests. Human flourishing is an Aristotlean term that refers to a way of living.

| Posted by Gary Sauer-Thompson at 1:15 PM | | Comments (8)
Comments

Comments

Higher order forms of (spontaneous) self-organisation, such as society, culture etc are not possible without individual liberty.

He is also side-stepping the point that rights are a form of restraint as well, whether legislatively, or individually. So rather than being selfishly, or internally focused, they form a just basis for individuals and larger bodies to interact.

If this is a more "sophisticated" version of right-wing polemics, I'd hate to read what the cruder versions are like. And coming from a law professor no less! Aren't "rights" in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, devolving from the Medieval notion of "liberties", as exemptions from the general oppression, or "right", in the continental tradition, deriving from the revival of Roman law to equip emergent nation-states with means to counter feudal particularities, among the most basic and oldest conceptions of Western jurisprudence, as permitting the definition, regulation, and adjudication of relations between citizens/subjects and the sovereign, however the latter is defined or described? And hasn't their contestation/expansion been central to the subsequent development of modern nation-states? What then authorizes the interpretation of them as reducing to a function of individual self-reference? And isn't the definition of communities as merely the sum of individual actions and interests making precisely the same reduction?

The lack of firm grounding of rights, according to Prof. Bargaric, might simply be a function of the non-autonomy or lack of self-sufficiency of jurisprudential reasoning, when separated from political processes. Now, if one perceives one's right or rights to be violated, one might well take umbrage and pursue a course of contestation. But how would such contestation be decided and how could one perceive the boundary between one's own right and the general interest? Wouldn't the epistemically clearer case be the perception of the violation of the right of another? In other words, rights could be "grounded" in the sense of human solidarity, as the mutual assurances and protections that make the life of community possible. But in that case, matters of right or rights, can not be separated from a broadly political context. Which separation is precisely what our good professor is trying to achieve, n'est-ce pas?

John, exemptions from the general oppression

I like that phrase. It is a very descriptive way to word 'just'.

John,
well spotted. Mirko Bagaric, the law Professor at Deakin uni, has served on the Refugee Review Tribunal and the Migration Review Tribunal in August.

Bagaric does like a bit of torture in the context of the war on terrorism. He is prepared to justify it legally as a moral means of saving lives.Consequently torture should be legalised and is a morally defensible interrogation method, even if it causes the death of innocent people.

The positon is argued for in Professor Mirko Bagaric and Ms Julie Clarke published paper, entitled, 'Not enough (official) torture in the world?The circumstances in which torture is morally justifiable','
So we have the rationalisation of torture for the greater good--good old utilitarianism. "Torture is permissible where the evidence suggests that this is the only means, due to the immediacy of the situation, to save the life of an innocent person."

The context of this is the changes to ASIO laws that mark a shift from individual rights to communal security of the national security state. Once again we see the state of exception---modern torture is its status as exceptional conduct.

Torture is about the exception because as a matter of criminal law, an official prosecuted for using torture may be able to invoke the necessity defence to claim his or her conduct was justified under the circumstances.

Secondly, as a practice, torture by modern states is exceptional because it is linked to states of exception or emergency. Over the past few years, scholars have increasingly recognised the importance of exceptions and emergency power and have begun to explore their qualities and limits.

The state of the exception has become the norm in the war of terrorism.


Yoo, brother! But at least he's doing his best to combat the evils of po-mo relativism, right?

Cameron,
Bagaric is playing an old academic game--a utilitarian bashing human rights. Consequentionalism versus deontology. It's a merry go round in liberal poiltical philosophy, which that has been questioned and undercut by the return to republican political philosophy in the 1980s.

Bagaric says that:

Given that rights have no justification, when they clash the winner is the person that yells the loudest - the antithesis of a moral code. While rights seek to "atomise" people, the reality of the human conditions is that we can't flourish without the involvement of others and the actions of one person (exercising his or her rights) can have a negative effect on the interests of others.

Only Bagaric confuses the issue by slipping in references to Aristotle: -well being as human flourishing and the common good.

It is a confusion because Bagaric, as an act utilitarian, is an individualist through and through. That is not Aristotle as his concern is the good life in the polis. As Hegel famously argued , the Greeks did not have a concept of individualism that is assumed by Bagaric. That concept comes with modernity and is given its first full expression with Hobbes.

John,
you write about the historical development of rights in modernity:

And hasn't their contestation/expansion been central to the subsequent development of modern nation-states? What then authorizes the interpretation of them as reducing to a function of individual self-reference? And isn't the definition of communities as merely the sum of individual actions and interests making precisely the same reduction?

Bagaric seems to imply that he is undertaking a conservative Burkean attack on individual rights in the name of community, social cohesion, tradetion etc; only to embrace a reductionist conception of society and the polity.

Me thinks this contradiction discloses the shift in utilitarianism as a public philosophy under pressure from the conservative conception of the national security state. Utilitarianism looks good in terms of the economy but not in the political.its understandignof the political was always its weakness as it reduced the political to the economy and to individual interests.

John,
'Right' in Anglo Saxon political philosophy refers to, and is identified with, individual freedom, and it is understood as a subjective claim that is in some sense distinquishable from our legal obligations and duties. As rights and duties do not coincide, right becomes a 'doing as I please' .

In contrast, 'right' for Hegel in the Philosophy of Right, stands for, or refers to, the whole basis and system of law that is based on individual freedom in a liberal polity.

Suprisingly, for a law professor, Bagaric misses the organic or necessary connection between the abstract conception of individual right as doing as I please and the system of law as constraint on doing as I please.

Because he misses this Bagaric then reduces right to the harmony between my arbitary will with the will of others, with the state reduced to a contract based on the arbitrary will of individuals.

Hell, even Hayek got the link between freedom and constraint.