June 21, 2006
The killing of Zarqawi was recently celebrated as a big event by Washington. It is the US's one big counter-insurgency success in Iraq:

But the killing of Zarqawi has had little or no discernible effect whatsoever on the prosecution of the guerilla war in Iraq, has it? Does this failure undercut the US geo-political strategy in Iraq? On the geo-political interpretation the war in Iraq was a deliberately calculated exercise of US power with a specific end in mind ---namely, control of Iraq and establishing US hegemony in the Persian Gulf region.
Robert Dreyfuss outlines this stragegy:
The Bush administration's strategy in Iraq today, as in the invasion of 2003, is: use military force to destroy the political infrastructure of the Iraqi state; shatter the old Iraqi armed forces; eliminate Iraq as a determined foe of US hegemony in the oil-rich Persian Gulf; build on the wreckage of the old Iraq a new state beholden to the US; create a new political class willing to be subservient to US interests in the region; and use that new Iraq as a base for further expansion.
I agree that the endgame is a permanent US military presence in the country, including permanent bases and basing rights, and a predominant position for US business and oil interests. The geo-political interpretation of the Iraq war makes sense.
The question is: will the Al Qaeda militants---ie., Zarqawi-style jihadis--- be able to ensure that the civil war between Sunni and Shiites makes Iraq so unstable that the Americans will have to leave? Or conversely, will the US be able to wage a brutal war of attrition against the resistance by the Sunni insurgents in Iraq for years to come?
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There are about 15,000 insurgents, who are largely headless in respect to the media. Other than Sadr, I cannot name one insurgent leader.