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July 5, 2009
Though Iraq was Bush’s most expensive mistake and the US withdrawal from Iraq cannot be considered a victory, Bush did provide his successor with a gift: the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq, which negotiated a timetable for the orderly removal of U.S. forces. The lame-duck Bush had to retreat from occupation because there were only two major factions in Iraqi politics: those who want the United States out within a couple of years and those who want the United States out now.
Dave Brown
The United States is no longer in a position to guide Iraq's political future.The task for the Iraq government is to end the civil war between the Shi'ites, Sunni's and Kurds and to keep the civil conflicts from becoming civil war. This is not going to easy in a corrupt Iraq.
Stephen M. Walt makes an acute observation on the military tactics and the much heralded surge:
Although often touted as a great success, the fate of the 2007 "surge" reveals the limits of U.S. influence clearly. Although it did lower sectarian violence, the surge did not lead to significant political reconciliation between the contending Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish groups. The "surge" was thus a tactical success but a strategic failure, and that failure is instructive. If increased force levels, improved counterinsurgency tactics, and our best military leadership could not "turn the corner" politically in Iraq, then prolonging our occupation beyond the timetable outlined in the SOFA agreement makes no sense. No matter how long we stay, Iraq is likely to face similar centrifugal forces, and our presence is doing little to reduce them.
Continued Sunni Arab resistance to the Shiite-dominated Maliki Government and the Kurdish-Arab wrangling over Kirkuk and other disputed territories--can only be resolved politically, not by military force.
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Ivan Arreguîn-Toft in a guest post on Stephen M. Walt blogs says:
Iraq is hardly a victory for the US.