|
November 9, 2010
Did anyone doubt that Australia would align itself ever more deeply with the US as the latter increases its security presence in the Asia Pacific region? That increased US presence is designed to counter China's increasing economic political influence in the region and Australia has decided to strengthen its network of alliances with the US. China's rise is radically shifting Asia's strategic balance.
China's rise presents the US with a serious challenge to its leadership of Asia for the first time in decades and raises the possibility of direct strategic confrontation between the US and China.
The problem for Australia, of course, is that China is Australia's main trading partner. Our economic prosperity in the near future now depends on us being a quarry to provide the raw materials for China's ongoing economic transformation.
In the Sydney Morning Herald Peter Hartcher poses the problem thus:
So Australia's income from China is booming exactly as its strategic commitment to America is strengthening. We are giving ever-deepening loyalty to the world's sole superpower yet taking ever more of our national livelihood from the potential superpower. Will the strain tear us apart?
Hugh White in Striking a new balance in The Age works through the implications of this either/or. He says:
The US can only retain its old leadership by forcing the Chinese to continue to accept the subordinate position that they have accepted until now. The more their power grows, the less willing the Chinese will be to accept that the harder they will push back, the more unstable Asia will become.On the other hand, unless the US is there to constrain it, China may throw its weight around in ways that harm its neighbours, including Australia. It is possible that China will try to do this anyway, but that is far from inevitable, and whether it does or not will depend a lot on how the US and others respond to its rise. The more the rest of us try to constrain China, the more disruptive it will become.
Kevin Rudd doesn't accept this either or. He argues for Australia to work with China to build a new kind of collective leadership that reflects the new distribution of power in Asia.
If so, then Australia, in throwing its hand in with the Americans, means that it is now up to the Americans to treat China as an equal. This will be hard for Americans to do, because the US has never before seen itself this way in relation to other global powers. It sees itself is the world's sole superpower and it has always acted since 1945 to contain any challenge to it that power. Barry R Posen in The case for Restraint at the American Interest Online describes it thus:
The United States must remain the strongest military power in the world by a wide margin. It should be willing to use force—even preventively, if need be—on a range of issues. The United States should directly manage regional security relationships in any corner of the world that matters strategically, which seems increasingly to be every corner of the world. The risk that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of violent non-state actors is so great that the United States should be willing to take extraordinary measures to keep suspicious countries possibly or even potentially in league with such actors from acquiring these weapons. Beyond uses of force, the United States should endeavor to change other societies so that they look more like ours. A world of democracies would be the safest for us, and we should be willing to pay considerable costs to produce such a world.
However, the US is now an weakened superpower: it is economically weakened with a weakened presidency. It is hard to run the world when you owe lots of people money and your debts keep piling up and you're stuck in costly wars.
Does it have the ability to transform its economy and international relations to meet the challenges of a new century? The US, from all accounts, is going to act to contain China. The United States is working to shore up existing alliances in Asia (Australia + Indonesia) and to forge some new ones (India). Is this an example of a shift to conceive of ways to shape rather than to control international politics?
Is this the emergence of the U.S. strategy of restraint that includes a coherent, integrated and patient effort to encourage its long-time allies to look after themselves? If others do more, this will not only save U.S. resources, it will increase the political salience of other countries in the often bitter discourse over globalization.
Are the liberal interventionists in the Obama administration shifting to conceiving the US security interests narrowly, using its military power stingily, pursue its enemies quietly but persistently, sharing responsibilities and costs more equitably, and watching and waiting more patiently.
|
Beijing has been playing the new economic game at a maestro level -- staying out of wars and political confrontations and zeroing in on business -- its global influence far exceeds its existing economic strength. China gains extra power from others' expectations of its future growth. The country has become a global economic giant without becoming a global military power. Nations do not fear China's military might; they fear its ability to give or withhold trade and investments.