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May 16, 2007
There is a review of Alexander Nehamas' Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art by John Armstrong in the Australian Literary Review. The Nehamas text had its origins in the Tanner Lectures on Human Values in 2001.
The subjective nature of beauty, which was mentioned in this post about Cape Willoughby, is addressed explicitly by Nehamas. We know that beauty, as a topic in aesthetics, has been downplayed in academia. Why so? Nehamas says that the cause of this neglect is that beauty is about passion, and the 20th century was suspicious of passion. It's not cool to say that you found x beautiful.

Gary Sauer-Thompson, sea cliff sky, Hanson Bay, 2007
John Armstrong, who is on the staff at the University of Melbourne and has written about beauty says that:
A longstanding anxiety about beauty is to do with the personal nature of taste. It is as individuals that we find things beautiful or not, and our individuality seems to be at work in those preferences; taste is a manifestation of personality.This has seemed, however, to undermine the idea that beauty is important, or worth talking about. "Beauty lies in the eye of the beholder" generally ends conversations; it implies that there's nothing else to say. There's a tendency to be very generous to disagreement: "Everyone has their own taste."
Armstrong says that the biggest hurdle faced by the idea of beauty is the basic thought that it is a subjective matter. It might be thought of as little more than a pretentious translation of nice or picturesque. So the only way to continue the conversation is to confront the subjective account of beauty.
Armstrong observes that Nehamas brings the right strategy to this problem. He realises that the big task is to reconcile the subjective character of the response to beauty with the importance of the experience. He distinguishes between moral claims and matters of taste. Moral claims demand wide agreement and at best draw us towards a universal human community. The role of taste is distinction or, in more modest terms, individuality. Though Armstrong is impressed, he is surprised when Nehamas asserts not merely tolerance of aesthetic diversity but an appetite for it.
However, Armstrong says that Nehamas shudders at the thought of any one of his opinions about what is beautiful being universally shared. Armstrong, unlike Nehamas wants universality.

Gary Sauer-Thompson, river scene, Hanson Bay, 2007
Armstrong argues that the neglect of beauty in academia and the arts in the 20th century is not a simple matter.
It's obviously not true that people in general disdained beauty; it's not that talking about what you love was thought silly by most people. It's not the 20th century that neglected beauty. It is, rather, leading university academics in the humanities and leading art critics who have ignored beauty. These are not ordinary people, mirrors of the disenchantment of the age. These are more like spreaders, agents of disenchantment. The question isn't why did the world as a whole turn against beauty, it is why did certain academics and art theorists do so and why did they have such sway?
These academics--eg., Naomi Wolfe and John Berger--- have argued that beauty was a myth, a social construct. This is the right approach given that beauty is a human value, even when we are talking about natural beauty and not moral beauty. These are not the same kind of things. Modernists deemed the 'form' of building to be beautiful, which is quite different from a human face being deemed beautiful because it expresses serenity, intelligence, graciousness, generosity and depth of spirit etc.

Gary Sauer-Thompson, sandstone cliff top, Hanson Bay, 2007
Armstrong argues his case by saying that:
The idea that beauty is a construct designed to please the rich or sell drinks is the sort of thing that someone could conceivably believe in a seminar room; but could they believe it while they look at the evening clouds, or admire the delicate architecture of their lover's ear? It is as if intellectual ideas are not to be measured against anything so humble or so real as one's own experience. For scepticism about beauty is really scepticism about oneself. It is a mode of anxiety.
Well, not really. We can distinquish between a beautiful image selling cosmetic or clothes for the fashion industry and natural beauty, I don't see that the scepticism about beauty is really scepticism about oneself. Sometimes the beautiful can turn into the sublime.

Gary Sauer-Thompson, sandstone cliff top #1, Hanson Bay, 2007
My state of anxiety relates to the sublime not beauty. Moreover, it is not just beauty that makes art more than mere entertainment or distraction. It can also be the sublime.
Armstrong explains the link between beauty and anxiety thus:
In trying to explain what we find beautiful we are laying open our souls, we are exposing the most tender and delicate of our intimate convictions. But quite often we can't let ourselves do this; we fall back on attitudes and preferences we are confident will be acceptable to others. Our taste doesn't get the chance to develop...But bringing such responses [he most tender and delicate of our intimate convictions] to the surface is a process that is easily disturbed and easily distorted. I think that for a large number of people there is a fear of being above themselves that casts its shadow upon their experience of beauty.
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